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The safety, security, efficiency, regularity, and sustainable development of 
international civil aviation operations revolve around, and are, therefore, mediated, 
administered, and regulated by a number of well-defined legal, policy, regulatory 
and methodological frameworks. These frameworks prescribe, inter alia, 
mandatory, advisory, prescriptive, or discretionary requirements in respect of 
interactivities in the civil aviation milieu. 
Fundamentally, in relation to this structured web of legal, policy, regulatory, 
and methodological frameworks, the Convention on International Civil Aviation 
(otherwise known as the Chicago Convention, 1944), which entered into force on 
4 April 1947, clearly represents the locus classicus. This convention established the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and is in accordance with 
Articles 91(b) and 92(b) of the Convention. With an authentic text that incorporates 
96 Articles, the Chicago Convention essentially governs the activities of ICAO 
Contracting States, which are effectively States that have deposited either 
instruments of ratification or notification of adherence in respect of the Convention 
to the depositary – the Government of the United States of America. 
The Chicago Convention embodies Annexes which have the status of 
international Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs). Standards are 
specifications “for physical characteristics, configuration, material, performance, 
personnel or procedure, the uniform application of which is recognized as necessary 
for the safety or regularity of international air navigation and to which Contracting 
States will conform in accordance with the Convention” (ICAO, 2011, p. viii) while 
Recommended Practices are specifications “for physical characteristics, 
configuration, material, performance, personnel or procedure, the uniform 
application of which is recognized as desirable in the interest of safety, regularity 
or efficiency of international air navigation, and to which Contracting States will 
endeavor to conform in accordance with the Convention” (ICAO, 2011, p. viii). 
The ICAO’s SARPs have been identified as having made an important contribution 
to “enhancing global aviation safety, interoperability, harmonization and 
efficiency” (ICAO, 2007a, para. 1.2). Today, there are a total of five Procedures for 
Air Navigation (PANS) and 19 Annexes, up from 18 following the addition of 
Annex 19 on Safety Management. There are also over 12,000 SARPs across the 19 
Annexes and 5 PANS to the Chicago Convention (ICAO, 2019). 
PANS, strictly speaking, do not have the same status as SARPs because 
while SARPs are adopted by the ICAO Council in pursuance of Article 37 of the 
Chicago Convention and subject to the full procedure of Article 90 of the 
Convention, the Procedures for Air Navigation are approved by the Council and 
recommended to Contracting States for worldwide application (ICAO, 2015). 
Frankly speaking, a greater chunk of the legal, policy, regulatory, and 
methodological frameworks at the national, sub-regional, and regional levels are 
directly distilled from the Chicago Convention 1944 and its Annexes. The Civil 
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Aviation Regulations of a State are, therefore, a domestication of the Annexes to 
the Chicago Convention 1944 and reflect the requirements for uniformity in 
standards, regulations, procedures, and organizational structures imposed by 
Article 37 of the Convention. Article 38 of the Convention, though, allows a State 
to - in the event of departures from international standards and procedures on the 
grounds of impracticability of compliance or the desire to adopt differing 
regulations or practices - file a notification to that effect with the International Civil 
Aviation Organization.  
This situation essentially underscores the global dimensions of civil 
aviation operations and the global nature of the essential elements of the civil 
aviation system. Huang (2009) noted that the risks incurred by civil aviation are 
global in nature and that global risks essentially require global management and 
call for international concerted action. Global management and international 
concerted action in respect of civil aviation operations necessarily exert tremendous 
demands not only on the imperativeness of consistency in terms of level of safety 
throughout the world but also on the necessity of assuring and maintaining equal 
levels of implementation of international civil aviation standards. It is equally true, 
though, that, given a number of peculiarities and exigencies – including political, 
geographical, developmental, governance and socio-economic realities, and 
differences – there will always be challenges in terms of uniformity of 
implementation of standards. This notwithstanding, international civil aviation 
standards define thresholds below which international civil aviation operations 
must not slide. 
To ensure the continuing safety, security, efficiency, regularity, and 
sustainable development of air navigation, a number of the Articles of the Chicago 
Convention (e.g. Articles 12, 21, 23, 25, 26, 28, 32, and 37) impose wide-ranging 
obligations and responsibilities on States. Article 12, for example, provides that 
each Contracting State undertakes: to adopt measures to insure that every aircraft 
flying over or maneuvering within its territory and every aircraft carrying its 
nationality mark, wherever such aircraft may be, shall comply with applicable rules 
and regulations; to maintain the uniformity of its regulations with those established 
from time to time under the Convention; and to ensure the prosecution of all persons 
violating applicable regulations.  
Of particular significance to operational safety and security is Article 32, 
under which a State incurs a responsibility in the area of facilitating the issuance of 
certificates of competency and licenses or the validation of such certificates or 
licenses issued by other States. To say the least, Article 32 to the Chicago 
Convention is critically germane to ensuring and assuring not only the continuing 
safety and security of international civil aviation operations but also the efficiency, 
sustainability, regularity, and economic development of international air 
navigation. The Article simply demands from States a responsibility that essentially 
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targets the identification of functions and jobs that are critical to operational safety 
and security as well as the appropriate training and licensing/certification of 
personnel performing the identified functions and jobs. 
Specifically, a license authorizes the performance of defined activities or 
functions which should otherwise be prohibited given the potentially serious 
implications of such functions or activities being performed improperly. The 
overall objective, of course, is not only to provide a set of standards, practices, and 
operational procedures which must be adhered to by the personnel so certified but 
also to enthrone a virile mechanism for the confirmation of personnel competency 
and for holding the personnel responsible and accountable for any actions 
undertaken in the performance of their safety-critical duties, including any act of 
commission or omission. 
This paper explores the concept and nature of aviation safety within the 
broader context of safety and safety regulation; examines the safety dimensions of 
CNS/ATM (communication, navigation, surveillance/air traffic management) 
systems and functionalities and identifies the critical elements of the air navigation 
safety web. In addition, it examines the main issues and challenges relating to air 
navigation safety, and presents an argument for globally-inclusive considerations 
in respect of a harmonized approach to the regulation of all the safety-critical 
elements of air navigation service, particularly the certification and/or licensing of 
CNS/ATM systems and functionalities. 
 
The Concept and Nature of Aviation Safety 
The term ‘safety’ has been subjected to a wide variety of definitions and 
conceptualizations with the implication that today there is, according to Fisher 
(2006), the absence of a formal, operational definition for the term. Fisher (p. 14) 
argues that the absence of an operational definition of safety and the resultant 
susceptibility of the term to wide, subjective interpretations have the potential of 
not only hindering “consistency in the delivery of regulatory programmes and 
quantitative performance measurement” but also resulting in “conflicting priorities 
and the consequent allocation of resources to lesser issues.” 
This scenario notwithstanding, extant conceptualizations and 
interpretations of the term reveal elements of consistency with operational realities 
in the civil aviation realm. Transport Canada Civil Aviation’s (TCCA) working 
definition of safety projects the term “safety” as “the condition where risks are 
managed to acceptable levels” (Fisher, 2006, p. 14). Using a variation of the 
definition provided by Hollnagel (2008), Lofquist, Greve and Olsson (2011) simply 
describe safety as “a process that produces outcomes that are safe” (p. 532). Safety 
has also been defined as the state in which the risk of harm to persons or property 
is reduced to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing 
process of hazard identification and risk management (EUROCONTROL, 2006). 
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Safety has been identified as an essential element for the existence of civil 
aviation (Mwikya & Mulwa, 2018) and has always been the prime reflection in the 
conduct of all aviation activities (Bala et al, 2013) aside from having been 
proclaimed by the aviation industry as its primary objective (Billings, 1997). 
Safety is aviation’s first priority and is at the core of ICAO’s Strategic 
Objectives, which also incorporate goals such as capacity and efficiency, security 
and facilitation, economic development, and environmental protection. This creates 
a multi-dimensional orientation that is a reflection of the increasing complexity and 
dynamic nature of the civil aviation industry.  
Aviation has been appropriately conceptualized as “a large industry, a true 
system of systems” that must necessarily be managed as such (European 
Commission, 2018, p. 11). As Lofquist (2010, p. 6) has also rightly noted: “The 
civil aviation industry can be described as a complex system of overlapping socio-
technical systems embedded within a highly competitive business environment, 
where safety is a primary, but not the only, goal.” For this reason, aviation safety 
requires a multidisciplinary approach involving the technical, economic, 
managerial, and legal perspectives (Huang, 2009) while the reliability of the 
infrastructure in use constitutes one of the key elements of the safety of any modern 
mode of transportation (Borener & Guzhva, 2014). 
Conceptualized within the framework of civil aviation operations, safety 
presents a two-pronged manifestation – from the perspective of operational safety 
and from the technical perspective, otherwise referred to as system safety. Maurino 
(2017) describes system safety as an engineering discipline whose objective is to 
ensure the safety of technical system by designing “safety” into the system during 
the system’s development. Maurino claims that “the significant progress in 
technology accomplished by aviation between the 1960s and the 1980s was in no 
small degree due to the contribution of system safety” (p. 8). From a historical 
perspective, the author further highlights a four-step hierarchical precedence-based 
architecture of intervention – design to eliminate safety concerns, incorporate 
safety devices, provide warning devices, and develop procedures and training – 
which emphasizes the exclusivity of improving technical systems and the 
implications of human error in the course of actual system operations. 
Within the context of its characteristic dynamism and complexity, the 
aviation industry has always existed as an embodiment of a tremendous vitality, 
which, according to Jung et al (2018), is premised upon the existence of a well-
established and global partnership. One of the key elements to maintaining the 
vitality of civil aviation is ensuring safe, secure, efficient and environmentally 
sustainable operation at the global, regional and national levels (Mwikya & Mulwa, 
2018). 
To say the least, security, efficiency, regularity, and environmental 
sustainability are closely linked to the safety of civil aviation. For this reason, 16 
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of the Chicago Convention’s 19 Annexes deal with safety, including the Annexes 
that relate to the efficiency and security of air navigation. Also, four PANS deal 
with the issue of the safety and efficiency of air navigation. 
There is, though, a clear distinction between aviation safety and aviation 
security. Oster, Strong and Zorn (2013, p. 161) explains the distinction thus: 
Improving aviation security involves thwarting attempts by individuals to 
disrupt, damage, or destroy parts of the aviation system intentionally. 
Improving other aspects of aviation safety involves reducing the chances 
that unintentional mistakes or unexpected failures of parts of the system will 
reduce the safety of air travel. 
Notwithstanding this distinction, the fact remains that safety includes 
security (Huang, 2009) and aviation security is an important part of aviation safety 
(Oster et al., 2013). According to Huang (2009, p. 5), “No matter how airworthy an 
aircraft is, and how competent its crew members are, air travel will not be safe if it 
is subject to terrorist attacks.” 
Aviation safety is essentially paradigmatic and multi-dimensional as its 
nature rests squarely with a wide variety of operational, technical, and regulatory 
exigencies. It has become the concern of the whole world and its importance is 
unanimously recognized (Huang, 2009) just as it is also seen as “central to ensuring 
that air transport continues to play a major role in driving sustainable economic and 
social development” (Jung et al, 2018, p. 1). 
The nature of aviation safety is such that there is nothing like absolute safety 
or the complete elimination of risks, accidents, or incidents. This situation has been 
attributed to the nature of the aviation industry, which renders the total elimination 
of accidents or serious incidents unachievable (Bala et al., 2013). It has been 
observed that if aviation must be free from any dangers or risks, it will not even 
exist at all because flight is inherently a risky venture carried out in a hostile 
environment at great speed (Huang, 2009). The importance of this reality is actually 
the fact that the safety, security, and efficiency of aviation revolves around 
regulatory, administrative, and operational approaches that are not only systematic, 
proactive, multi-dimensional, and dynamic but also completely devoid of 
complacency. As the late Dr. Assad Kotaite, the then President of the Council of 
ICAO, had rightly reiterated in his opening address to the 2006 Directors General 
of Civil Aviation Conference on a Global Strategy for Aviation Safety (ICAO, 
2006, sec. 7.1) “There is absolutely no room for complacency where safety is 
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Aviation Safety: A Paradigm Shift 
There have been considerable improvements in aviation safety records and 
this situation can be attributed to a wide variety of operational, technical, and 
regulatory factors. Dehais et al. (2015) ascribe these improvements in safety records 
to the development of automation in aviation, while Oster, Strong and Zorn (2013) 
attribute the improvement in aviation safety to technological improvements in 
aircraft, avionics and engines, improvement in navigational aids and air traffic 
management, improvement in weather forecasting, and better understanding of 
weather phenomena such as downdrafts and wind shear. 
Paradoxically, these improvements have the potential to metamorphose into 
a double-edged sword. Borener and Guzhva (2014) have argued, in relation to air 
traffic management (ATM) operations, that the technological advances that 
improve ATM efficiency and safety have a secondary impact in the form of what 
the authors referred to as “degraded modes from malfunctioning or inoperable 
systems” (p. 1753). With this perspective, the increasing betterment of the aviation 
safety records consequent upon technological evolution may well be considered to 
be more of a paradoxical phenomenon that requires a paradigm shift in safety 
approaches in order to continue to ensure the safety, efficiency, and security of air 
navigation. 
Historically, aviation safety has been built upon the reactive analysis of past 
accidents as well as the introduction of corrective actions to prevent the 
reoccurrence of those events (Bala et al., 2014). This overture deploys the 
prescriptive approach to managing safety and is also based exclusively on strict 
compliance with regulatory requirements. It is premised upon an acceptance of the 
fact that “learning from safety occurrences is an essential component to improving 
aviation safety” (ICAO, 2007b, para. 1.1). It equally emphasizes a research focus 
on aviation safety, which has been riveted on “analyzing accidents, investigating 
their causes, and recommending corrective action” (Oster et al., 2013, p. 149). 
Interestingly, however, the trend today is towards increasing emphasis on 
proactive and predictive systems to manage safety (Galotti, Rao, & Maurino, 2006). 
This is being driven by contemporary realities, including the reality of “a rapidly 
expanding industry and limited resources at oversight authorities” (Galotti et al., 
2006, p. 6) as well as “evolving aviation safety realities particularly the connection 
between organizational issues and safety and the complexities of human 
performance within operational contexts” (Osunwusi, 2014, pp. 6, 10). These 
realities are actually revealing the sheer inadequacy of this reactive and 
predominantly regulatory approach to improving aviation safety thus forcing a 
paradigm shift towards a systematic approach to aviation safety that integrates risk 
management, compliance-based safety strategies and performance-based safety 
approaches as well as emphasizes human factors and the organizational dimensions 
of safety. 
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It has been argued that aviation safety goes beyond accident prevention 
from a technical point of view and extends to more profound political, strategic, 
and legal dimensions, including preventive, remedial, and punitive measures 
(Huang, 2009). For this reason, there has been a shift towards a more proactive 
approach, which, in the words of Oster et al. (2013, p. 149), “involves identifying 
emerging risk factors, characterizing these risks through modeling exposure and 
consequences, prioritizing this risk, and making recommendations with regard to 
necessary improvements.” 
This proactive approach conceptualizes aviation safety as a multi-
dimensional and multi-sectorial paradigm and extends the horizon of aviation 
safety to capture the entire spectrum of aviation safety management, thus 
culminating in the concept of Safety Management, which, according to Thomas 
represents a collection of specific practices for organizational safety management 
that has “emerged as a conglomerate of safety-related activities that enabled an 
organization to discharge their responsibilities under the spectra of self-regulation” 
(2012, pp. 1-2). It aims, in the words of Maurino (2017, p. 11), “at turning safety 
and its management in socio-technical systems into a business function, along lines 
similar to those through which finance, legal, human resources, quality and any 
other business of the organization are managed as business functions.” It 
emphasizes a systems approach on safety, while focusing, at an aviation 
organization, on safety of the operation and the types of hazards that can contribute 
to a catastrophic accident (Roelen & Klompstra, 2012), with the overall goal of 
allowing the identification and management of flaws before accidents occur 
(Kaspers et al, n.d.). Lofquist (2010, pp. 5-6) describes this type of approach as one 
involving “interaction and involvement from the system operators and business 
leaders and managers responsible for both system performance and for safety 
outcomes prior to undesired events”, whilst also requiring “a robust safety 
management system that is integrated into the overall strategic business objectives 
of an organization within an expanded industrial business context that can 
anticipate changes in an operative environment while balancing safety with 
economic goals.” 
The global civil aviation realm took a bold step towards proactive and 
systematic safety strategies with the adoption on February 2013 by the ICAO 
Council of Annex 19 – Safety Management – with an applicability date of 
November 2013. As aviation safety management is becoming a regulatory 
requirement rather than an industry best practice (Roelen & Klompstra, 2012), 
ICAO has introduced - under a provision that took effect on 24 November 2006 - a 
new requirement for States to ensure: 
• The establishment of Safety Management System (SMS) as well as 
an acceptable level of safety; and 
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• The implementation of SMS by aviation organizations, specifically 
aircraft operators, aircraft maintenance organizations, air traffic 
service providers and certified aerodrome operators. (Osunwusi, 
2014, p. 11) 
Safety Management system (SMS) is defined as “the systematic 
management of all activities to secure an acceptable level of safety” (van der Geest 
et al., 2003, p. 33) or a planned, documented and verifiable method of managing 
hazards and associated risks (Bottomley, 1999, cited in Thomas, 2012), which 
effectively moves the primary mechanism for safety management from prescriptive 
regulation to organizational responsibility (Thomas, 2012). 
Thomas (2012) identifies three transitional phases for safety management. 
Based on the transition of safety management from the fragile system of 1920s to 
1970s – typified by accident investigation and individualized risk management – 
and the safe system of 1970 to mid-1990s – typified by incident investigation and 
technology/regulation to the modern Ultra-safe system of mid-1990s onwards, 
typified by business management approach to safety, Thomas (2012, p. 3) also 
defines SMS as the “third age of safety.” 
Two interesting paradigmatic perspectives on safety have emerged from the 
evolving proactive, predictive, and systematic approach to managing safety, 
particularly within the context of human factors and the organizational 
ramifications of safety. These perspectives relate to the emergence of the concepts 
of “Safety Intelligence” and “Safety Wisdom.” Safety intelligence refers to the 
various sources of quantitative information – incident data and other safety 
information on precursor events – which an organization may use to identify and 
assess various threats, and to provide “reasonable predictions about likely accidents 
and measures to avoid them” (Makins et al., 2016, p. 3).  
Safety Intelligence, as reiterated in ICAO (2013), not only “provides 
actionable information used to drive ICAO’s safety strategy and programmes” but 
also “enables the organization to create a holistic understanding of safety issues by 
consolidating and benchmarking a number of safety performance indicators and 
providing guidance used to develop assistance for Member States, regional and sub-
regional organizations” (p. 17). Safety wisdom, on its part, refers to “the judgment 
and decision-making of those in senior positions who must decide what to do to 
remain safe, and how they use quantitative and qualitative information to support 
those decisions” (Makins et al., 2016, p. 5). It, therefore, rests squarely upon the 
critical-thinking ability of those at the top of the organizational hierarchy as well as 
on the perceptions of those leaders in relation to the philosophies of aviation safety 
vis-à-vis organizational goals. 
Another paradigmatic shift that has emerged from the safety management 
concept is the organizational principle of safety culture or just culture, a paradigm 
that the European Commission (2018) has referred to as an enduring safety mindset. 
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Safety or just culture represents a principle that lays a strong emphasis on a non-
punitive approach to safety information through an enduring protection of not only 
the information but also those who file such information. It also emphasizes the 
safety significance of non-criminalization of incidents and accidents. To be sure, 
the presence of internal rules for Just Culture is already an important aspect of 
European aviation organizations in keeping with Article 16(11) of Regulation (EU) 
No. 376/2014. 
 
Safety Dimensions of CNS/ATM Systems and Functionalities 
Aviation accidents and incidents are not, to say the least, stand-alone 
occurrences. As succinctly posited in the 2009 final report of the Causal Model of 
Air Transport Safety project commissioned by the Netherlands’ Ministry of 
Transport and Water Management,  
Aviation accidents tend to result from a combination of many different 
causal factors (human errors, technical failures, environmental and 
management influences) in certain characteristic accident categories (loss 
of control, collision, fire etc.), whose causes and consequences differ 
according to the phase of flight in which they occur (taxi, take-off, en-route 
etc.). (Ale et al., 2009, p. 8) 
In ECORYS’ (2013) study, five accident categories are identified – based 
on the EUROCONTROL Accident Incident Model – where ATM may contribute 
significantly in terms of accident causation or prevention. The accident categories 
comprise: mid-air collision, CFIT (controlled flight into terrain), runway collision, 
taxiway collision, and wake turbulence accident. Interestingly, the air transport 
operational sphere is replete with the history of accidents or incidents that 
underscore the safety ramifications of CNS/ATM systems and functionalities in 
respect of some of the accident categories identified in the ECORYS’ study or in 
relation to the phases of flight highlighted in Ale et al (2009). 
An often cited event in connection with the safety dimensions of CNS/ATM 
technical operations is the fatal mid-air collision at an altitude of 34,890 feet on the 
night of July 1, 2002 involving Bashkirian Airlines Flight 2937, a Tupolev TU-154 
passenger jet on a northern heading of 004°, and DHL Flight 611, a Boeing 757 
cargo jet on a western heading of 274°, over Ueberlingen, Germany in airspace 
controlled by Switzerland’s private air navigation service provider - Skyguide. The 
accident killed the two crew members of the Boeing 757 and all the 69 passengers 
and crew aboard the Tupolev TU-154, including 45 Russian school children who 
were on a school trip to Costa Dorada, Spain. Investigators identified a number of 
causative factors including: procedural ambiguities in respect of TCAS’ use; and a 
number of technical and procedural shortcomings on the part of Skyguide. 
The series of CNS/ATM –related events contributing to the Ueberlingen 
accident included a sectorisation work being carried out in the night from 1 to 2 
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July, 2002, in order to re-arrange the Zurich area control sectors for which there 
were neither briefings regarding the technical and operational implications nor 
coordination with adjacent air traffic control (ATC) units; the maintenance work 
being carried out, consequent upon the sectorisation exercise, on the image 
processing system of the main radar, which resulted in the use of a fallback system 
with the consequence of delayed radar data and an increase of the separation 
minimum from 5 to 7 NM. Other issues included the switching off for maintenance 
of the ground-based optical collision warning system, which could have drawn the 
attention of the duty air traffic controller (ATCO) to the pending collision; the lack 
of information to the duty ATCO, who was handling two workstations at the time 
of the accident, in respect of the maintenance of the main radar and the optical 
collision warning system; the non-availability to the Skyguide ATCO at the time 
of the accident of direct phone connections with adjacent ATC units; and the lack 
of an automatic change-over of incoming calls to the bypass system. 
One particular downside of the outcome of the Ueberlingen accident is that 
Peter Nielsen, the lone ATCO handling the airspace at the time of the accident, and 
not an ATSEP (air traffic safety electronics personnel), had to pay the supreme 
price when, on February 24, 2004, he was stabbed and killed by a Russian, Vitaly 
Kaloyev, who had lost his wife and two children in the accident.  
Beyond the Ueberlingen accident, there are quite a number of accidents or 
incidents where investigations had initially targeted the functional integrity of CNS 
systems or where either on-board avionics working cooperatively with ground-
based CNS/ATM systems or a component of the CNS system has been implicated. 
An example is Alitalia Flight AZ404, a DC 9 airliner, which crashed into the 
Stadlerberg Mountain, Weiach, Switzerland on 14 November 1990, as it 
approached Runway 14 of Zurich Airport, Switzerland on an international 
passenger flight that originated from Milan Linate Airport, Italy killing all 46 
people on board. Investigation found multiple factors leading to CFIT (controlled 
flight into terrain) with the initial focus of investigators being on whether the ILS 
was sending the proper signal consequent upon the mysterious glide path shown on 
the Radar track. Aside from pilot error and GPWS (ground proximity warning 
system) failure caused by a short-circuit on the NAV receiver, investigation 
concluded that the pilot’s Instrument Landing System (ILS) display provided 
incorrect values due to a faulty NAV receiver as the ADI/HSI had apparently 
captured the glide slope. 
Less than a year before Ueberlingen, specifically on October 8, 2001, at 
Milano Linate Airport, Italy, a Scandinavian Airlines MD 87 jet, on a take-off, 
crashed into a private Cessna 525 aircraft, which had strayed onto the runway in 
dense fog, killing all 110 passengers and crew aboard the MD 87 and all 4 
passengers and crew aboard the Cessna as well as 4 airport workers on the ground. 
The lack of an Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A-
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SMGCS) radar at Linate prevented the ATCO from detecting the presence of the 
Cessna on taxiway R6 intersecting the runway. The deployment of the same type 
of surveillance system could have also helped to prevent aviation’s deadliest 
disaster at Los Rodeos (now Tenerife-North Airport) on March 27, 1977, which 
recorded 583 fatalities. 
There is also the case of Loftleider Icelandic Airways Flight LL001, a DC 
8 airliner operated on behalf of Garuda Indonesia Airways, which crashed, on 15 
November 1978, into a rubber and coconut plantation about 2 kilometres from the 
threshold of runway 22 of Colombo-Katunayake Airport, Sri Lanka while on a 
Radar vectored ILS approach, killing 183 out of the 262 people on board. Although 
the probable causes of the accident were crew’s error, erroneous distance/altitude 
information provided by the Radar controller and the failure of approach lighting 
system, the Icelandic Directorate of Civil Aviation blamed the accident on 
inadequate maintenance of ILS facilities resulting in a downward bending of the 
glide path approximately 3.5 nautical miles from touchdown zone. The Icelandic 
authority also revealed that the ILS at Colombo-Katunayake Airport had not been 
calibrated for 11 months as against international calibration policy requiring ground 
checks and flight calibration to be carried out once in three months and once every 
six months respectively. 
The reference to inadequate maintenance of ILS facilities as a causative 
factor in a fatal air accident is not only an unmistakable pointer to the safety 
criticality of CNS/ATM systems and functionalities but is also a clear wake-up call 
to the need for globally-inclusive and internationally harmonized and standardized 
procedures for assuring the competency and certification of personnel involved in 
the task of ensuring the adequate maintenance, operation, trouble shooting and 
calibration of safety-critical CNS/ATM systems. Underscoring the significance of 
this reality and having regard to the need “to safeguard against erosion of technical 
expertise”, van der Geest et al. (2003, p. 123) have, through Recommendation 7-3 
in the seminal report on Aviation Safety Management in Switzerland, re-echoed the 
need for the licensing and certification of air traffic safety electronics personnel 
(ATSEP) and ATC equipment. Aside from this, the ATSEPs have been identified 
as playing a crucial part in the ATM system such that “mistakes of the ATSEPs 
might lead to incorrect operation of systems, with a potential negative impact on 
safety” (ECORYS, 2013, p. 30). 
Two air events – an incident with no fatality and an accident involving 229 
fatalities – vividly depict the possible nexus between CNS/ATM-related 
inadequacies, confusion, and failures and the possibility of a CFIT accident. The 
incident involved an Air New Zealand Flight NZ60 – a Boeing 767 – on an auto-
coupled ILS approach to runway 08 at Faleolo International Airport, Apia, Western 
Samoa, which, on the night of 29 July 2000, carried out a missed approach from an 
altitude of about 400ft, some 6 miles short of the runway due to a suspected 
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erroneous glideslope capture. The timely go-around executed by the pilot in 
command helped to avert a CFIT that could have claimed 176 lives. Investigations 
revealed that the NZ60 crew had knowledge of NOTAMs on the status of Faleolo, 
including the fact that the ILS Glideslope had no standby transmitter and the fact 
that the ILS Glideslope, VOR, and ILS/DME were unmonitored. Investigations 
also revealed that the ILS Glideslope was actually in the control (monitor) bypass 
mode and operating without standby transmitter. With this, the unserviceable 
transmitter was sending out invalid glideslope guidance information with the 
transmission of only the Carrier plus Side Bands (CSB) while the Side Bands only 
(SBO) signal was missing. The aircraft’s on-board cockpit glide path and localizer 
indications, though, were perfectly normal. The NZ60 incident actually provoked a 
response from the Secretary General of ICAO through the issuance of State Letter 
AN 7/5-01/52 dated 11 May, 2001, on the general subject of incidents caused by 
operational use of ILS signals radiated during testing and maintenance procedures. 
The air accident, which killed 229 passengers and crew, occurred on August 
6, 1997, and involved Korean Air Flight 801 – a Boeing 747-300 – which crashed 
into a remote area on Nimitz Hill, some 3 nautical miles short of the runway while 
on approach to runway 6L of Antonio B. Won Pat International Airport in the U.S. 
territory of Guam. The CNS/ATM issues related to the event included: the fact that 
the airport’s ILS Glideslope was unserviceable, while the captain believed it was in 
service; and the crew’s confusion about the location of the DME such that while 
the captain believed that the system was sited at the airport, it was actually located 
at the NIMITZ VOR site located some 3.3 nautical miles from the airport. 
Aside from the direct implication of CNS/ATM facility functional 
inadequacy or failure on the safety of air navigation, quite a number of studies has 
established positive correlations between CNS/ATM performance and/or service 
availability and the safety and efficiency of air traffic services. A 2014 study 
(Borener & Guzhva, 2014), which probed the direct impact of communication and 
surveillance facility service outages on aviation safety in terms of traffic separation 
events, found that unscheduled service outages of ATM systems were associated 
with lost or reduced traffic separation events, albeit the likelihood of a separation 
event was not dependent upon the type of facility that experienced a service outage. 
The seminal study – conducted with a data sample comprising 222 communication 
and 116 surveillance unscheduled service outages – revealed that the reduced or 
lost traffic separations associated with ATM facility service outages can be 
considered precursors to hazardous loss of traffic separation events. 
Beyond air accidents and incidents, the safety significance of CNS/ATM 
technical operation is underscored, to a greater extent, by the increasing 
complexities of air navigation services, the continuous and sustained growth of 
traffic volumes worldwide, and the huge financial implication of investments in air 
navigation systems (vis-à-vis the emergence of new business models and their 
12
International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 7 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol7/iss1/8
implications on safety). There is also the continuous emergence of new 
technologies, which is driving a revolutionary paradigm shift towards 
modernization, harmonization, system interoperability and extensive networking. 
Of particular relevance to the emergence of new technologies is the emerging 
threats and risks of cyber security to civil aviation operations. 
As a corollary, the ongoing rapid transformation of the roles, jobs, and 
functions of ATSEPs consequent upon the increasing complexity of CNS/ATM 
operational and technical environments as well as the exponential growths of 
technological innovations, particularly the increasing incursion of automation 
technology into the CNS/ATM techno-operational terrains also constitutes a clear 
pointer to the safety dimensions of CNS/ATM systems and functionalities. It has 
been argued that “the heterogeneity and complexity of existing and emerging 
automated CNS/ATM systems are re-defining not only the roles and tasks of 
ATSEP but also issues surrounding their competency, certification, and 
authorization” (Osunwusi, 2019, p. 13). 
This dimension brings into focus the safety dimension of the human 
elements in civil aviation operations. The human element, according to Dumitru 
and Boscoianu (2015, sec. 1) “is the most flexible, adaptable and valuable part of 
the aeronautical environment, while being the most vulnerable.” The vulnerabilities 
surrounding the human element actually represent the key element underscoring 
the safety significance of aviation operations. They also exert great demands in 
respect of the institutionalization of competency-based, certification-enabled, and 
globally-harmonized procedures and mechanisms for safely managing and 
mitigating the hazardous effects of these vulnerabilities. 
 
Elements of the Air Navigation Safety Web 
In managing safety and creating the margin of safety, aviation has always 
relied on overlapping and interacting systems (Oster et al., 2013) consequent upon 
the inherent dynamic and complex nature of the industry. The aviation system has 
been described as being not merely safe, but resilient (European Commission, 
2018) while air traffic services have been conceptualized as team efforts that 
necessarily involve different groups working collaboratively to deliver a seamless 
service to the aircraft (ICAO, 2004). However, in terms of what actually constitute 
aviation safety, including operational flight safety, a holistic consideration and 
examination of these “overlapping and interacting systems” are important not only 
for a meaningful conceptualization of the paradigm of aviation safety but also for 
the effective and efficient management of safety. 
In relation to the shortcomings attending investigations into air accidents 
and incidents in recent times, Lofquist (2010) identifies, as one problem for the 
civil aviation industry, the excessive focus upon incidents and accidents as 
extraordinary events, while Oster, Strong and Zorn (2013, p. 150) note rather 
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frankly that by “focusing on the root cause of an accident, organizational and 
managerial conditions that contributed to the accident may be overlooked.” It can 
also be argued, as a corollary, that by focusing attention on a restrictive set of 
functionalities to the exclusion of others that are clearly enmeshed in the same 
safety web, functionalities as well as technical, operational, and administrative 
elements that impact operational safety may be overlooked. 
The implication of this argument is that aviation safety is effectively a 
multi-dimensional and multi-sectorial concept whose influence permeates every 
fabric of the aviation system. Within this perspective, this paper proposes, as 
illustrated in Figure 1, the safety-critical elements of the air navigation safety web, 
based on functions and jobs relevant to air navigation and ATM.  
A function is defined in ECORYS’ (ECORYS, 2013, pp. 15-16) study on 
safety-related and safety-critical functions and jobs in Air Traffic Management/Air 
Navigation Services (ATM/ANS) as “an activity performed either by humans or a 
system which transforms an input into an output on the basis of established 
procedures and objectives” while a job is “all activities, intellectual and physical, 
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The study also identifies functions and jobs within the ATM/ANS services 
that are “safety-related” and “safety-critical;” a safety-related function being a 
function, the failure of which could impact safety and a safety-related job being a 
job that “involves performing at least one safety-related function” (p. 33) while “A 
function is safety-critical if a failure of the function could impact the safety and 
there are no barriers within the ATM/ANS system to prevent an accident following 
the of the function” (p. 33) and a job is safety-critical “if the job involves 
performing at least one safety-critical function” (p. 33).  
Based on the definitions of safety-related and safety-critical functions and 
jobs and the application of the EUROCONTROL Accident Incident Model, which 
was originally christened the “Integrated Risk Picture (IRP) model”, the ECORYS 
study identifies a total of 143 safety-related functions with the following 26 jobs 
regarded as safety-related: Air traffic controller, ATC supervisor, ATC instructor, 
ATC Assessor, ATC Examiner, ATSEP – System Monitoring and Control, ATSEP 
– Surveillance, ATSEP – Navigation, ATSEP – Communication, ATSEP – Data 
Processing, ATSEP – Instructor, Meteorological information officer, Aeronautical 
information service officer, Aerodrome Flight Information officer, Flight 
information service officer, Airspace Management Cell (AMC) coordinator, High 
level airspace policy makers, Network management officer, Flow Management 
Position (FMP), Airspace designers, Navigation data provision officer, ATM/ANS 
technical system designer, On-the-Job-Training-Instructor, HR Manager, Staff 
instructor, and safety management officer. 
Of the 143 safety-related functions identified, 28 functions and 9 associated 
jobs are regarded as safety-critical. The safety-critical jobs are: Air traffic 
controller, ATSEP – System Monitoring and Control, ATSEP – Surveillance, 
ATSEP – Navigation, ATSEP – Communication, ATSEP – Data Processing, 
Aeronautical information service officer, Navigation data provision officer, and 
ATM/ANS technical system designer. 
Aside from this, and having regard to the nature and safety significance of 
the jobs and functions of CNS/ATM technical personnel, the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) - in its International Standard Classification of Occupations 
and under ILO List of Professional Occupations No. 3155-ISCO 88 Minor Group 
(ILO, 2012, p. 75) – classifies ATSEPs as aviation professionals who occupy the 
same professional level as air traffic controllers, aircraft pilots and related associate 
professionals. 
 
Air Navigation Safety: Issues and Challenges 
The safety of air navigation revolves around a wide variety of factors 
emanating from both within and outside the aviation system. The Working Paper 
A36-WP/242, presented by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Member States of 
the Arab Civil Aviation Commission (ACAC) to the 36th Session of the ICAO 
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General Assembly in 2007, emphasize the fact that “Development and growth of 
air traffic at the international level require the adoption of modern methodologies, 
mechanisms and approaches in planning and implementing all elements relating to 
air navigation” (ICAO, 2007c, para. 4.1). 
The expanding aviation system of today “comprises multiple and 
interrelated systems that are geopolitically diverse, technologically complex and 
highly multidisciplinary” (ICAO, 2013, p. 4). With this perspective, the question of 
whether the aviation industry will continue to be characterized by steady 
transformations is, perhaps, no longer open to debate. These transformations may 
not necessarily be limited to the future as they are actually becoming realities in the 
contemporary aviation realm. It is also clear that the transformational movement 
will continue to reveal issues and challenges that have far-reaching implications for 
the safety of civil aviation operations. 
Smith, Roelen and den Hertog (2016, p. 3) note that transformations 
affecting the future of aviation system will come in the following two distinct 
categories: 
• Progressive or rapid-onset physical, functional, and procedural 
changes that stakeholders plan for the aviation system with the 
deliberate intention of improving throughput, safety and/or 
efficiency/economics.  
• Unintentional technological innovation, shifting operational tasks, 
subtle changes in organizations or actors in the system, and 
contextual factors external to aviation itself that can nonetheless 
influence the robustness of the support systems upon which 
operational safety depends. 
 
The European Commission (2018) identifies five major challenges to safety 
in aviation. These are: 1) New Business Models ( the development of new business 
models due to the development of new technologies and increasing business 
competitiveness); 2) Automation (the increasing automation of aviation and the 
safety implications of automation failures); 3) Drones (the increasing presence of 
unmanned aircraft and challenges associated with safety and regulation); 4) Cyber-
security (the emerging threats of cyber-attacks); and 5) Adverse weather (the safety 
implications of weather-induced phenomena such as icing, thunderstorms, fog, 
micro bursts, and so on). 
Oster et al (2013) identify the emerging issues and challenges in aviation 
safety as including: challenges relating to improving and maintaining the 
remarkable improvements in safety performance; issues surrounding the increasing 
development of larger and long-range aircraft and the concomitant demands in 
terms of reliability and performance; issues surrounding the extension of the safety 
record of large airlines to other less safe segments of commercial aviation; 
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challenge relating to the increasing need to factor in safety risks from aviation 
infrastructure especially in respect of airport/runway operations and air navigation; 
issues surrounding the imperativeness of human factors in aviation safety; and 
challenges relating to the need to improve and extend data analytics. 
In relation to the provision of air navigation services, the International 
Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) has identified challenges relating to 
corporatization, privatization, outsourcing, and subcontracting, which have “led to 
increasing fragmentation both in the provision of air traffic services and in the 
maintenance of navigational aids and ground-based equipment such as radar and 
telecommunications” (ICAO, 2004, sub-section 1.1.). There are also challenges 
related to environmental issues (including the problem of carbon emission), the 
increasing evolution of new technologies, and the emerging threats and risks of 
cyber security. 
 
CNS/ATM Functionalities: Certification Considerations 
One phenomenal dilemma of the global aviation safety realm is the 
undeniable fact that while the aviation system and aviation safety issues have 
steadily maintained their dynamic and multi-dimensional nature, the mechanisms 
for international standards, rules, and modus operandi from which national safety 
frameworks at institutional, regulatory, and legal levels draw their sustenance have 
remained, to a great extent, characteristically static, one-dimensional and 
bureaucratic. The existing regulatory frameworks for air navigation services and air 
traffic management on the global, regional and national levels are essentially 
disproportionate, disjointed, and incomprehensive. 
Presently, there is a noticeable lack of any form of harmonized and globally-
inclusive approach to system and personnel regulation as far as the provision of air 
navigation services, specifically CNS/ATM services, are concerned. This 
represents a fundamental safety gap particularly given the fact that such regulations 
have the potential of serving as a vehicle for fostering and ensuring the continuing 
safety, efficiency, and security of international air navigation. Kistan, Gardi and 
Sabatini note: 
While there is a comprehensive regulatory framework for ATM 
(International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), European Aviation 
Safety Agency (EASA), FAA, Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), etc.), 
today, ground-based ATM systems are not required to be formally certified 
in the same manner as avionics. For example, ATM systems are not 
required to comply with either the Radio Technical Commission for 
Aeronautics (RTCA) DO-278 or DO-254. (2018, p. 13) 
Van der Geest et al. (2003) have also noted not only the fact that ATC 
equipment, unlike aeronautical equipment, is not certified but also the fact that ATC 
equipment technicians are not licensed contrary to almost all other personnel in 
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aviation. While observing that Switzerland’s Skyguide is not an exception, the 
authors posited that “it does nevertheless seem illogical that rulemaking around 
safety critical equipment and the associated personnel are so poorly developed” 
(van der Geest, 2003, p. 81). In the context of the European Union, this lack of a 
comprehensive regulatory framework for ground-based ATM systems extends, as 
revealed in the ECORYS’ ( ECORYS, 2013, p. 11) study, to “other functions and 
jobs related to the design, production and maintenance of ATM/ANS systems and 
constituents as defined in Regulation (EC) No. 1108/2009.” 
As noted in the ECORYS’ (2013) report, although the European Union’s 
(EU) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 1035/2011 establishes 
safety provisions in respect of the engineering and technical personnel involved in 
the provision of CNS/ATM services, the regulation “neither provides any criterion 
for the definition of safety-related or safety-critical tasks performed by engineering 
and technical personnel, nor does it establish any requirement for its 
implementation” (ECORYS, 2013, p. 11). Aside from the noticeable absence of a 
comprehensive regulatory framework for CNS/ATM systems, the existing 
procedural and regulatory frameworks relating to the certification of CNS/ATM 
functionalities are equally disproportionate, and disjointed both at the global and 
regional levels. For instance, while there is a lack of a comprehensive licensing 
framework for air traffic safety electronics personnel (ATSEPs) in relation to the 
European Union, Commission Regulation (EU) No. 805/2011, which regulates air 
traffic controllers (ATCOs), contains specific requirements for the licensing of air 
traffic controllers, including persons and organisations involved therein, albeit 
there is a formalized designation for ‘safety-related’ and/or ‘safety-critical’ 
functions in relation to both ATSEPs and ATCOs (ECORYS, 2013, p. 11). 
On the global perspective, despite the fact that there are international 
SARPs and a wide variety of guidance material regulating air traffic safety systems, 
there is no globally harmonized procedures for regulating the function of ATSEP 
nor is there any system of certification that will confer the responsibility that will 
mandate accountability. This scenario reflects the present unsafe status whereby air 
traffic controllers are essentially licensed, while there is no form of licensing or 
certification regime in respect of all the other safety-critical and security-sensitive 
personnel within the same air traffic management system. 
Within this context, it is pertinent to state that Annex 1 to the Convention 
on International Civil Aviation currently provides Standards and Recommended 
Practices for the licensing of the following aviation personnel: flight crew members 
(pilots, flight engineers and flight navigators); air traffic controllers; aeronautical 
station operators; aircraft maintenance personnel 
(technicians/engineers/mechanics); and flight operations officers/flight dispatchers 
(ICAO, 2011, Chapter 1, section 1.2). However, there are currently growing 
agitations in respect of the need to expeditiously include certain critical functions 
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hitherto excluded from Annex 1 given contemporary and emerging civil aviation 
operational realities, particularly the human factors and safety implications of the 
increasing incursion of the new technologies into civil aviation operation terrains. 
The International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) has, for instance, argued for 
the introduction of a set of ICAO regulations that cover the licensing of all air 
navigation service providers including maintenance organizations and suppliers of 
safety-critical parts (ICAO, 2004). 
Having regard to the peculiarities of their operational terrains, the 
identification of the safety-criticality of certain civil aviation functions, and the 
leeway copiously provided by Article 38 of the Chicago Convention 1944, some 
States – including Nigeria, which deposited a notification of adherence in respect 
of the Chicago Convention on 14 November 1960 -  have entrenched in their 
national laws appropriate training, licensing and/or certification regimes for certain 
functions and personnel hitherto excluded from ICAO Annex 1. For example, Part 
2 (Personnel Licensing) of the Nigeria Civil Aviation Regulations provides for the 
licensing of the following aviation personnel: flight crew members (pilots and flight 
engineers); flight dispatchers; flight instructors/ground instructors; aircraft 
maintenance engineers; aviation repair specialists; air traffic safety electronics 
personnel (ATSEP); parachute riggers; flight radio telephony operators (restricted 
licence); air traffic controllers; aeronautical station operators; and cabin crew 
(Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority, 2015, Part 2, Sub-section 2.2.1.1). 
In spite of this kind of initiative by the States concerned, concerns still 
remain on the need to harmonize the licensing procedures and ensure the 
international uniformity requirements contained in Article 37 to the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation. In recent times, therefore, the agitations for the 
inclusion of certain aviation functions and jobs in ICAO Annex 1 - in order to meet 
Article 37 requirements - have been escalated to the ICAO General Assembly, 
which convenes every three years. Table 1 highlights some of the events and efforts 
that are especially relevant to the agitation for the inclusion of ATSEP in ICAO 
Annex 1 (Personnel Licensing) in recent times. 
It is pertinent to observe, at this juncture, that reactions and responses at the 
ICAO General Assembly level to the deafening cries for the institutionalization of 
a globally harmonized and comprehensive certification and personnel regulation 
frameworks for the air navigation services realm have been somewhat mixed. At 
best, the situation reflects a lack of adequate comprehension of the philosophies of 
aviation safety particularly in the context of the growing complexity and 
modernization of civil aviation operations. For example, with respect to the joint 
working paper, A36-WP/210, presented to the 36th Session of the Assembly in 
2007 by IFATSEA (International Federation of Air Traffic Safety Electronics 
Associations) and ITF, the ICAO Technical Commission, in view of the support of 
the majority of delegates for the proposal on licensing standards for ATSEP, 
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“agreed that the concept of establishing licensing requirements for ATSEP could 
be supported in principle but had to be referred to the ICAO Council for further 
consideration in view of its financial implications” (ICAO Technical Commission, 
2007, para. 30.4.5). 
However, in respect of Working Paper A37-WP/160 on ATSEP 
competencies and licenses presented to the 37th Session of the Assembly in 2010 
by IFATSEA, the Commission reports: 
Other comments shared were: in relation to A37-WP/160, that licensing was 
not the only means of demonstrating ATSEP competencies; that new 
provisions developed by the NGAP Task Force should not overly impact 
developing States and that transition measures be considered in the case of 
new requirements; and that the scope of the NGAP Task Force be expanded 
in a timely manner to include the development of competencies for 
aerodrome professionals. (ICAO Technical Commission, 2010, para. 45.8) 
 
In consideration of Working Paper A38-WP/151 presented to the 38th 
Session of the Assembly in 2013 by Indonesia, an ICAO Contracting State, the 
Commission comments: 
 
The Commission recalled that ICAO had developed in cooperation with 
International Federation of Air Traffic Safety Electronics Associations (IFATSEA), 
competency frameworks for ATSEPs as a means to foster high quality and globally 
uniform training. The Commission did not come to consensus on whether a 
sufficient safety case was available to justify the development of international 
licensing provisions for personnel outside of the scope of the existing disciplines 
covered under Annex 1. (ICAO Technical Commission, 2013, para. 38.12) 
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 Table 1 
Events Relevant to the Struggles for the Establishment of Universal ATSEP Certification 
Principles and Standards 
Year Events 
2000 30th IFATSEA General Assembly, Montreal, Canada – Interactions among 
IFATSEA members, the ICAO secretariat and ICAO Air Navigation Commission 
members led to the recognition of the fact that ATSEPs were trained to certain 
standards. 
2003 ICAO 11th Air Navigation Conference, Montreal, Canada, 22 September-3 October 
– The conference, inter alia, highlighted the need to subject issues surrounding the 
training, competency, and qualification of ATSEP to further investigation. 
2004 Development of an ATSEP Training Manual, November – The Training Manual 
was approved by the ICAO and the unedited version published as ICAO Doc 7192 – 
AN/857 (Part E-2). The Manual effectively set the stage for any proposal regarding 
the inclusion of ATSEP in ICAO Annex 1. 
2004 35th ICAO General Assembly, Montreal, Canada, 28 September – 8 October – 
Under Agenda Item 23: Consolidated statement of continuing ICAO policies and 
practices related to communications, navigation, and surveillance/air traffic 
management (CNS/ATM) systems, the International Transport Workers’ Federation 
(ITF) presented Working Paper A35-WP/198 on “Personnel Regulation as a Tool to 
Support Safety and Security in Air Traffic Services”, which invited the Assembly to, 
inter alia, develop requirements for the certification or licensing of ATSEPs and 
other safety or security sensitive or critical functions as well as request the ICAO 
Secretariat to develop proposals for the regulation of working time for ATSEPs and 
ATCOs. 
2007 36th ICAO General Assembly, Montreal, Canada, 18-28 September – Under 
Agenda Item 30: Other Safety Matters, IFATSEA and ITF presented a joint working 
paper, A36-WP/210. The working paper invited the ICAO General Assembly to, 
inter alia, develop regulatory requirements for the licensing of ATSEPs and for the 
certification of safety-critical CNS/ATM systems and equipment. 
2010 37th ICAO General Assembly, Montreal, Canada, 28 September - 8 October – 
Under Agenda Item 45: Next Generation of Aviation Professionals, IFATSEA 
presented working paper, A37-WP/160, on “Competencies and Licenses of Air 
Traffic Safety Electronic Personnel (ATSEP)”, which invited the Assembly to 
recognize the global context of ATM/ANS, support the updating of ICAO regulations 
including Annex 1, and endorse the concept of ATSEP licensing. 
2013 38th ICAO General Assembly, Montreal, Canada, 24 September - 3 October – 
Under Agenda Item 38: Other issues to be considered by the Technical Commission, 
Indonesia presented working paper, A38-WP/151, on “The Integration of Air 
Navigation Personnel into Annex 1”, which invited the Assembly to request the 
ICAO Council to update Annex 1 – Personnel Licensing – by developing 
requirements for air navigation personnel, comprising AIS personnel, ATSEPs, and 
flight procedure designer personnel. 
2016 39th ICAO General Assembly, Montreal, Canada, 27 September - 7 October – 
Under Agenda Item 37, IFATSEA presented working paper, A39-WP/298, on “The 
Inclusion of Air Traffic Safety Electronics Personnel into Annex 1”, which invited 
the Assembly to request the Council to undertake the necessary steps to develop 
licensing requirements for ATSEP including updating ICAO Annex 1. 
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 The Commission comments further: 
 
The Commission noted that the absence of international licensing 
provisions would not preclude States or regions from establishing their 
own national certification or licensing requirements. The Commission 
agreed that, resources permitting, the ICAO Council be requested to 
identify the safety case for the development of international licensing 
provisions beyond the current scope of disciplines covered under Annex 1. 
(ICAO Technical Commission, 2013, para. 38.12) 
 
A literal interpretation of the ICAO Technical Commission’s comments 
above would suggest not only a tacit admission of the safety significance and an 
endorsement of licensing provisions for ATSEPs but also a veiled dismissal of the 
need for international uniformity in the spirit of Article 37 to the Chicago 
Convention. The comments also suggest a situation where operational safety is held 
hostage by undue and unsafe considerations of the economic consequences of 
treading the paths of safety, security, and operational efficiency.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper explored issues surrounding aviation safety within the context of 
a globally-harmonized and comprehensive safety regulation environment and with 
an emphasis on the safety ramifications of CNS/ATM systems and functionalities. 
The dynamic and complex nature of aviation safety is quite incontestable and is 
tied to the evolutionary strides of the aviation systems. The larger picture that this 
assertion is painting is that functionalities, tasks, systems, and techniques that were 
considered safe or unsafe at a point in time in the past may not necessarily be the 
case today. As Huang (2009) has rightly argued: 
Safety is also a dynamic rather than static concept. It has a strong temporal 
sense. What was considered safe or unsafe yesterday may not be so today. 
(p. 4) 
 
The imperativeness of institutionalizing a unified and globally-inclusive 
approach to the regulation of CNS/ATM systems and personnel cannot be 
overemphasized. A unified approach to system certification has the potential of not 
only checking the chaotic deployment of a multiplicity of systems but also ensuring 
that CNS/ATM systems are designed, built, installed, and commissioned in 
accordance with the same globally-specified standards of safety, security, and 
reliability.  
The benefits of a unified approach to regulating CNS/ATM personnel include: 
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• Harmonized licensing and certification approaches that foster the 
standardization of competences and a uniform level of service as well as 
uniform and highest standards of operational safety; 
• The efficiency, safety, and regularity of operations strengthened by 
harmonized and globally-standardized competency-based training and 
certification frameworks that emphasize responsibility and accountability; 
• The consequential development and availability of well-defined globally-
inclusive safety requirements for personnel involved in the maintenance, 
operation, installation, supervision, calibration, and commissioning of 
CNS/ATM systems. The safety requirements will also provide veritable 
means for confirming and certifying the competence of personnel; 
• Harmonized environments for coordinating all air traffic management 
activities in furtherance of the safety, security, efficiency, and regularity of 
air navigation; and 
• The harmonization of regulatory frameworks for air navigation services 
vis-à-vis the global civil aviation regulatory framework. 
To be sure, automation is a naked reality of today’s ATM operational 
environments. Although, the reality surrounding the “ironies” and “surprises” of 
automation has been sufficiently acknowledged and defined (e.g., Bainbridge, 
1983; Dehais et al., 2015; Sarter, Woods & Billings, 1997), CNS/ATM technical 
personnel continue to face challenges of novelties such that there is an overarching 
need for harmonized, standardized and well-defined competency-based training 
and regulatory frameworks that are tailored towards specific levels of automation. 
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